Alfred Schutz

• Who is Alfred Schutz
• Phenomenological Perspectives in Sociology
• Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz
• Social Phenomenology
• Four Division of Lifeworld
• Sociology and Phenomenology

Biographical Sketch

Alfred Schutz, born in Vienna, Austria on April 13, 1899, and passing away on May 20, 1959, in New York, USA, was a significant figure in both philosophy and social phenomenology. He is increasingly acknowledged as one of the notable philosophers of social science in the 20th century. Schutz’s contributions were instrumental in connecting Edmund Husserl’s philosophical framework with social sciences. His major work, “Phenomenology of the Social World,” published in 1932, had a profound impact on shaping the philosophical foundations of sociology and economics, particularly within the Weberian tradition.

Emigrating to the United States in 1939, Schutz began teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York, where he remained until his death in 1959. During his tenure, he formulated a social science framework grounded in phenomenology, which emphasized understanding the social presuppositions inherent in everyday life. Schutz’s insights shed light on how social reality is constructed through symbols and human actions. His work paved the way for the development of ethnomethodology, a field focused on studying people’s intuitive grasp of social interaction structures.

Education and Later Life

In 1918, Schutz began his studies at the University of Vienna, where he pursued a degree in law. During this time, he also attended classes at the Viennese Academy of International Trade, focusing on international law from 1919 to 1920. While at the University of Vienna, he encountered Max Weber’s lectures but found his inquiries into the nature of meaning lacking, a sentiment attributed by Wagner (1983) to Schutz’s first hand experiences of war and the hardships upon his return to Vienna, which was suffering from economic devastation and famine.

Following a successful career in international banking, Schutz married Ilse Heim in 1926. He assumed the role of chief financial officer at Reitler and Company, a prominent banking firm in Vienna. Notably, he was once referred to by Edmund Husserl as “a banker during the day and a philosopher at night.” As the threat of Hitler’s ascension in Germany loomed in 1933, Schutz, along with other intellectuals from Vienna, sought refuge in allied nations, ultimately relocating to Paris in 1938 as political exiles. Despite the displacement, Schutz continued his work as an international lawyer at Reitler and Company.

In 1943, Schutz commenced teaching sociology and philosophy classes at The Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research. His duties encompassed presenting papers in the school-wide general seminar, overseeing dissertations, and serving as chair of the Philosophy Department from 1952 to 1956. Despite his numerous commitments, he maintained a robust philosophical exchange with Farber, Aron Gurwitsch, Fritz Machlup, Eric Voegelin, and Maurice Natanson, who were his graduate students from 1951 to 1953. However, thus far, only his correspondence with Gurwitsch has seen publication under the title Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939–1959.

Intellectual Career

Schutz drew inspiration from several influential thinkers including Ludwig von Mises, Henri Bergson, William James, and Edmund Husserl. Although his focus was primarily on phenomenology and social science methodology, Schutz’s main objective was to establish a philosophical framework for the social sciences. Despite similarities to George Herbert Mead’s examination of social interactions, Schutz diverged significantly by criticizing Mead’s behaviouristic approach.

Despite not being a direct student of Husserl, Schutz, along with his colleague Felix Kaufmann, extensively studied Husserl’s work in their pursuit of a foundation for interpretive sociology rooted in Max Weber’s ideas.

In 1932, Schutz published his first book, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The Meaningful Structure of the Social World), later translated into English as The Phenomenology of the Social World. He emphasized the importance of analyzing everyday life, arguing that it held more significance for understanding than philosophical or scientific observations.

In his work, Schutz offers both praise and critique of Weberian perspectives on relevant issues. He particularly admires Weber’s concept of the “ideal type,” which excludes personal biases or values from social theory, advocating for a value-free stance. Expanding on this notion, Schutz suggests that sociological inquiry should acknowledge the relevance of values rather than striving solely for objectivity. He proposes the use of bracketing, derived from Husserlian phenomenology, as a method to surpass the limitations of ideal-type analysis. This work gained him recognition from Husserl, leading to frequent visits and correspondence until Husserl’s passing in 1938. Despite Husserl’s invitation for Schutz to be his assistant at Freiburg University, personal reasons prevented him from accepting the offer.

Schutz’s primary focus lies in understanding how individuals grasp the consciousness of others while navigating their own subjective experiences. He extensively discusses intersubjectivity, relating it to the social realm, particularly emphasizing the social construction of knowledge. Much of his research centers on the concept of the “lifeworld,” where individuals shape social reality within the confines of existing social and cultural frameworks. He delves into the dialectical interplay between individuals’ construction of social reality and the persistent social and cultural structures inherited from previous generations.

Schutz is renowned for his perspective that humans inherently seek to classify everything, whether it be people or objects, as a means to better comprehend them within societal contexts. He posited that these classifications greatly influence how we perceive and engage with the social world.

His ideas and concepts are brought to light through a profound exchange of thoughts with Talcott Parsons, a prominent figure at Harvard. Their discussions primarily revolved around the interpretation of “social action.” Scholars have examined whether this correspondence can be labelled as a “dialogue” rather than a “debate,” with Rehorick delving into this analysis in 1980. Additionally, a critical evaluation of the original exchange involving Eric Voegelin sheds further light on the core disparities between Schutz and Parsons. This exploration underscores that their conceptual and theoretical discrepancies stem from distinct “ways of knowing,” indicating fundamentally contrasting approaches to social scientific thinking.

Legacy of Schutz

Schutz’s contributions have left a lasting imprint on the landscape of social sciences, particularly within phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology, as evidenced by the works of Harold Garfinkel. Thomas Luckmann, deeply influenced by Schutz’s teachings as his protégé, carried forward Schutz’s legacy by completing his unfinished work on life-world structures after Schutz’s passing. Notably, Peter L. Berger, another disciple of Schutz, emerged as a prominent figure in sociology, drawing heavily from Schutz’s ideas to formulate the theory of social construction. This theory delineates how externalization, objectification, and internalization processes collectively shape our perception of reality. Berger and Luckmann leveraged Schutz’s framework to delve deeper into the realms of human culture and reality, thus paving the way for a novel sociology of knowledge.

He enlisted in the artillery division of the Austrian army during World War I and served on the Italian front before resuming his studies at the University of Vienna. At the university, he delved into law, social science, and business under the guidance of notable mentors such as Hans Kelsen and Ludwig von Mises. However, his most formative academic experiences occurred within the vibrant intellectual circles of Vienna, particularly the renowned Mises Circle, where he became an active member of the subgroup known as Schlick. Within this circle, he forged enduring friendships with prominent scholars who would shape the tumultuous decades ahead, including economists like Gottfried von Haberler, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Fritz Machlup, and Oskar Morgenstern, as well as philosophers like Felix Kaufmann and political scientist Eric Voegelin.

While advancing his academic pursuits, Schutz assumed the role of executive officer at Reitler Company in 1927, a prominent Viennese banking establishment with global connections. This marked the initiation of a lifelong routine characterized by Edmund Husserl as “a banker during the day and a philosopher at night.”

From the outset, Schutz was captivated by the methodological writings of Max Weber, who had delivered lectures in Vienna during the summer of 1918, garnering immense popularity among Viennese intellectuals. Nevertheless, Schutz perceived a limitation in Weber’s approach, as he believed Weber’s focus on specific sociological issues hindered him from delving into fundamental epistemological inquiries unrelated to his immediate concerns.

Between 1925 and 1927, Schutz delved into Henri Bergson’s philosophy regarding consciousness and inner time, seeking to elucidate concepts such as meaning, action, and intersubjectivity. The culmination of his efforts resulted in the publication of manuscripts titled Life Forms and Meaning Structure. During this exploration, he also recognized the significance of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time consciousness.

His seminal work, The Phenomenology of the Social World, emerged in 1932, receiving accolades from Husserl himself, who hailed Schutz as a “earnest and profound phenomenologist.” Throughout the 1930s, Schutz focused on composing concise essays demonstrating how his phenomenological approach to the social world could integrate with the economic theories of Mises and Hayek. Before engaging directly with American pragmatism, he developed a manuscript on personality within the social realm, emphasizing the pragmatic aspects of everyday social interactions.

Schutz’s professional journey, both in academia and business, faced significant upheaval during Adolf Hitler’s annexation of Austria into Germany on March 13, 1938. This tumultuous period led to his separation from his family during a business trip to Paris for three months, eventually prompting his emigration to Paris. Utilizing his expertise as an international lawyer and businessman, Schutz assisted numerous intellectuals in escaping Austria. However, escalating Nazi influence pushed him and his family to immigrate to the United States on July 14, 1939.

Upon arriving in the U.S., Schutz continued his work aiding immigrants and contributed to the re-establishment of Reitler and Company’s business operations. Additionally, he supported the American war effort by providing insights into German and Austrian economic affairs for the Board of Economic Warfare. Collaborating with Marvin Farber, Schutz played a key role in founding the International Phenomenological Society, where he often mediated initial conflicts. Furthermore, he played a significant role in establishing and editing Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

During his time in the United States, Schutz authored a compilation of essays covering a diverse array of topics. These included elucidating and critiquing Husserl’s philosophy, analysing the ideas of American thinkers such as William James and George Santayana, engaging with continental philosophers like Max Scheler and Jean-Paul Sartre, and formulating his own philosophical stances on subjects ranging from social sciences to temporality, language, multiple realities, responsibility, and symbolism. Additionally, he delved into socio-political inquiries concerning strangers, returning citizens, informed individuals, and equality, as well as exploring themes in literature and music.

Following Schutz’s footsteps, several intellectuals have continued his philosophical and sociological legacy. Maurice Natanson, for instance, underscored the interplay between individual, existential, and social dimensions of everyday life. Thomas Luckmann, who collaborated in posthumously publishing Schutz’s “The Structures of the Life-World,” extended Schutz’s sociology of knowledge and highlighted disparities between scientific understanding and everyday life, emphasizing language, symbolism, and societal moral order. Others like John O’Neill integrated Schutz’s ideas with Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the lived body, while Richard Grathoff examined experiences of normalcy within specific social contexts. Ilja Srubar explored the practical aspects of Schutz’s philosophy, including its economic and political implications, while Lester Embree clarified Schutz’s scientific classifications, and Fred Kersten expanded upon his aesthetic theories. Harold Garfinkel, drawing inspiration from Schutz, introduced ethnomethodology. Globally, numerous scholars have dedicated themselves to Schutz’s work, with archives in Germany, Japan, and the United States preserving his writings and correspondence.

Schutz passed away on May 20, 1959, in New York City, at the age of 60.

Phenomenological Perspectives in Sociology

Phenomenological perspectives within sociology delineate a fundamental disparity between the subject matter of the social and natural sciences. They contend that the methods and assumptions employed by the natural sciences are ill-suited for the study of human beings. Unlike the natural sciences, which concern themselves with inert matter, human beings possess consciousness, thoughts, feelings, intentions, and a sense of self-awareness. Consequently, their actions are imbued with meaning and purpose. Unlike atoms and molecules, which react in a predetermined manner to external stimuli without consciousness, humans actively interpret situations and attribute significance to their actions and those of others. Thus, while natural phenomena can be observed and explained through external observation and measurement, the internal logic of human consciousness necessitates a different approach—one that acknowledges the complexity of human agency and meaning-making.

Consider the reaction of early humans to fire, sparked by natural phenomena like volcanic eruptions or spontaneous combustion. Their response wasn’t uniform; rather, they attributed various meanings to the experience of heat, shaping their actions accordingly. Fire wasn’t merely seen as a source of warmth; it served multiple purposes, such as cooking food, providing defence against predators, and reinforcing spear points. These interpretations influenced how they interacted with fire. From a natural scientific standpoint, however, assigning meaning to fire becomes challenging, given its subjective nature and our contemporary understanding.

Max Weber emphasized the importance of interpreting actions through the subjective lens of the actor rather than imposing external logic. He stressed the need to observe and interpret the subjective states of mind of individuals to understand their actions fully, laying the groundwork for interpretive sociology.

Interactionism, adopting a phenomenological perspective, places significant emphasis on the dynamics of interaction. Unlike positivism, which prioritizes empirical facts and causal links, interactionists focus on gaining insight and understanding. Since delving into the minds of individuals is impossible, uncovering meaning relies on interpretation and intuition.

Consequently, achieving objective measurement in the social sciences, as seen in natural sciences, is unattainable. Meanings are continuously negotiated during ongoing interactions, making it challenging to establish causal relationships. Some sociologists argue that sociology is confined to interpreting social actions, leading to phenomenological approaches being termed ‘interpretive sociology.’

Critics within this approach suggest that positivism has distorted our understanding of social life. They argue that it portrays humans as passive responders to external stimuli rather than active creators of society. According to them, humans react to various influences and pressures, shaping the infrastructure of social systems.

According to Peter Berger, society has frequently been analogized to a puppet theater, where individuals are depicted as “little puppets” carrying out assigned roles on invisible strings. This perspective suggests that society dictates values, norms, and roles, and individuals passively comply like marionettes. Nevertheless, adopting a phenomenological viewpoint, it becomes evident that humans are not mere reactors to external societal forces; they are also agents of action. Through interactions with others, individuals actively shape their own interpretations, construct their realities, and consequently, steer their own behaviours.

Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz

Alfred Schutz, a prominent figure in the field of phenomenology, applied this philosophical and methodological approach to the social sciences. Phenomenology, characterized by its investigation into the structures of consciousness from a first-person perspective, was embraced by Schutz, who viewed it as akin to the natural sciences. His particular variant, known as social phenomenology, can be seen as an expansion of this broader philosophical framework.

The roots of phenomenology stretch back centuries, but it crystallized into its modern form in the early 20th century through the contributions of thinkers like Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others. Husserl, often credited as the founding figure of phenomenology as an academic discipline, laid much of its foundational groundwork.

At its core, phenomenology concerns itself with the exploration of human experience and how we perceive the world. It focuses on phenomena—things as they appear—and is primarily descriptive rather than explanatory. The fundamental aim of phenomenology is to offer a lucid, unfiltered depiction of the ways in which things manifest themselves. Numerous underlying assumptions drive the practice of phenomenology, shaping its evolution and application over time.

1. Firstly, phenomenology dismisses the notion of objective research, opting instead to examine assumptions through a process known as phenomenological epoche.
2. Secondly, phenomenology asserts that a thorough understanding of nature can be gleaned from analyzing everyday human behavior.
3. Thirdly, phenomenology emphasizes the exploration and interrogation of persons rather than individuals. From a sociological perspective, this is partly because persons can be better understood through the unique ways in which they reflect and symbolize the society in which they exist.
4. Fourthly, phenomenologists prioritize the collection of capta, or conscious experiences, over traditional data gathering methods.
5. Lastly, phenomenology is characterized by its orientation towards discovery, prompting phenomenologists to employ research methods that are less restrictive compared to other scientific disciplines.

Social Phenomenology

Social phenomenology, a branch of phenomenology, explores how individuals utilize everyday interactions to construct a sense of reality and intersubjectivity. The primary focus of Schutz’s work lies in the methods employed for shaping reality through mundane experiences. Expanding upon this framework, the social construction of reality and ethnomethodology emerge as disciplinary extensions of Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology.

Farganis highlights phenomenological sociology’s subjective nature, emphasizing its approach of comprehending reality through the viewpoint of the acting subject rather than the perspective of a detached scientific observer. According to Schutz and fellow sociological phenomenologists, this discipline aims to uncover and document the social structures influencing our world by delving into the content of our consciousness regarding our perception of everyday social reality and how this reality is shaped and manifested.

Schutz, alongside fellow social phenomenologists, focuses primarily on the intricacies of everyday life, which they term the lifeworld. This lifeworld represents an intersubjective realm where individuals both shape social reality and are influenced by the existing social and cultural frameworks established by previous generations. The lifeworld concept finds application in philosophy and various social sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology. It underscores a mode of existence where the world is not just observed but actively lived and experienced. As a foundational concept for phenomenological analysis within the tradition of Husserl, the lifeworld serves as a pre-epistemological framework.

In describing the lifeworld, Schutz highlights the pervasive uncertainty that characterizes the relationships between the social and natural realms. While individuals in the natural world often accept their surroundings without questioning the concept or significance of meaning, the dynamics shift in the realm of social sciences. Here, understanding is subjective, shaped by individual actions and interactions in face-to-face, distant, or impersonal relationships. Such understanding eludes explanation through the laws, theories, or principles of the natural sciences.

The Four Divisions of the Lifeworld

Natanson characterizes Schutz as the leading voice of phenomenology representing the “Lifeworld,” or the everyday world. This concept, central to Schutz’s theoretical framework, is divided by him into four distinct sub-worlds.

Schutz posits that our social experience encompasses a vast realm, distinguishable between directly experienced social reality and a social reality beyond direct experience. He labels the first sub-world as “Umwelt,” which he further defines as the realm of “consociates” or “fellow-men,” those individuals who share a common space and time with the observer.

In contrast, individuals not directly perceived by the observer are categorized into three additional sub-worlds:

1. First comes the world of my contemporaries (Mitwelt)
2. The world of my predecessors (Vorwelt)
3. The world of my successors (Folgewelt)

The final two realms, Vorwelt and Folgewelt, symbolize the bygone and the forthcoming, respectively, while contemporaries (Mitwelt), who cohabit within the same temporal and spatial context, stand apart by their potential to evolve into comrades (Umwelt).

Schutz delved into delineating ‘the shift from direct to indirect encounters…with these poles framing a continuum of experiences,’ alongside the gradual depersonalization of the Mitwelt: a ‘gradation towards anonymity.’ For instance, in the absence of a friend, one might encounter their described brother; a renowned professor whose works have been studied; a postal clerk; or even abstract entities like Himachal Pradesh, the rules of English grammar, or the foundational principles of sociology, all embodying anonymity while contributing to societal functions.

According to Schutz, as we venture further into the world of contemporaries, people become increasingly anonymous. This anonymity is most pronounced in artifacts that reflect the subjective meanings of unknown individuals. In his later works, Schutz delved into the intertwining of various dimensions of social relations, often characterized by varying degrees of anonymity. For instance, when discussing a research article on the attitudes of the executing agency of a power project in the Himalayan region of India with a friend, the relationship extends beyond the immediate interaction to include the anonymous author of the article and the contemporary actors referred to in the terms “Executing Agency,” “Hydropower,” and “Himalayas.”

Based on the preceding description, it is evident that phenomenology, as expounded by Husserl, focuses on the study of phenomena, emphasizing a descriptive approach rather than an explanatory one. Its central objective is to offer a clear, unclouded depiction of how things manifest. Building upon this framework, Schutz expanded phenomenology into social phenomenology, highlighting its concern with how individuals utilize everyday interactions to establish a sense of reality and mutual understanding. His exploration delves into the mechanisms underlying the construction of reality through ordinary experiences, encapsulated in the concept of the “lifeworld” originally proposed by Husserl. Schutz further subdivided the lifeworld into four components to delve into the subjectivity of actions as they unfold. The influence of Schutz’s theories extends into the disciplinary realm, giving rise to ethnomethodology within sociological discourse as a means of understanding social phenomena. 

Sociology and Phenomenology

Alfred Schutz, a philosopher and sociologist, pioneered a sociological approach deeply rooted in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. His work laid the foundation for subsequent scholars like Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger. This paradigm has significantly shaped modern sociological theory and empirical research methodologies, including ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, socio-scientific hermeneutics, and the biographical narrative approach.

Regarding the relationship between sociology and phenomenology, it’s crucial to note their distinct epistemological, methodological, and methodological approaches. Sociology focuses on analysing tangible historical and empirical phenomena like power structures and societal inequalities within specific contexts and timeframes. Building on Berger and Luckmann’s concept of the “social construction of reality,” sociology employs a diverse range of qualitative and quantitative methods to empirically investigate these phenomena. From a sociological standpoint, historical worlds emerge through socially constructed experiences and actions.

On the contrary, phenomenology delves into how reality forms based on the fundamental structures of experience rooted in conscious activities. This field of study explores how the appearances of reality manifest themselves within our subjective consciousness, examining how they present in both space and time. Edmund Husserl, the pioneer of phenomenology, emphasized the necessity for the phenomenologist to return “to the things themselves,” indicating a return to the objects as they are directly experienced.

Consciousness, according to phenomenology, always pertains to something; it exhibits “intentionality,” directing its focus towards the “things” or objects it engages with. Therefore, the tangible world in its spatial and temporal expressions is only comprehensible in relation to conscious activities such as experiencing, perceiving, thinking, and remembering. Phenomenological research aims to uncover the intentional activities of our subjectivity, describing how the world and its objects are brought into existence.

Despite their distinct epistemological interests, sociology and phenomenology can mutually enrich each other in their research endeavours. Alfred Schutz, for instance, applied Husserlian phenomenological principles to reshape Max Weber’s Interpretive Sociology by redefining the notion of “subjective meaning” inherent in action processes. Thomas Luckmann also underscores a symbiotic relationship between phenomenology and sociology, suggesting that they can complement and corroborate each other’s findings. Luckmann emphasizes the importance of grounding sociological research in the “structures of the life-world” to ensure comparability of research outcomes.

At the heart of the connection between phenomenology and sociology lies Alfred Schutz’s theory of the life-world. This theory posits that the individual’s life-world constitutes a pre-theoretical realm of experience, centered on the everyday reality governed by pragmatic motives. Within this framework, individuals engage in action, work, and communication. Additionally, the life-world encompasses various social constructs and transcendent realities such as dreams, fantasies, religious beliefs, and scientific paradigms. Schutz’s exploration of concepts like “the stranger,” “the homecomer,” and “the well-informed citizen” exemplifies his application of phenomenological principles to sociological inquiry.

In addition to Schutz’s significant role in bridging sociology and phenomenology, highlighted in several articles within this dossier, there are additional authors and viewpoints in this volume that further underscore the benefits of integrating sociology with philosophy overall, and phenomenology specifically. Despite certain influential sociologists’ skepticism about the practicality of merging these disciplines, the methodological approach has demonstrated its effectiveness in various ways, elucidating how sociology and phenomenology can collaborate to enhance our understanding of society amidst contemporary transformations.

References and Readings:

The Phenomenology of Social World, by Alfred Schutz, https://nupress.northwestern.edu/9780810103900/phenomenology-of-the-social-world/

Phenomenology and Social Reality, by Maurice Natanson, https://a.co/d/3KHE2Pb